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Towards a General Preference System David Wall
The following is an amended text
of a contribution by Fir. D. Wall to
a recent IDS conference on the out-
'come of UNCTAD 2 which took place
at the White House, Isle of Thorns on
May 25th 1968.
BACKGROUND
The resolution of UNCTAD I (Final
Act Annex A: 111:5) and UNCTAD II
(UNCTAD Document No. TD/II/RES/21) on
the subject of preferences are
substantially the same. The resolut-
ion passed in New Delhi does not,
however, reflect the substantial
progress which has been made ort the
ubject since 1964. The four years
between the conferences have seen
feverish activity in various inter-
governmental centres attempting to
clarify complex issues involved and
to reconcile the conflicting positions
of the various countries and groups.
At first little progress was made.
The turning point came in a speech made
by Presideht Johnsón to a meeting of
Heads of American States at Punta del
Este early in 1967. In this speech
President Johnson said "...we think
this idea (preferences) is worth
pursuing. We will be discussing it
further with Inember3 of Congress, with
business and labour leaders, and we
will seek the cooperation of other
governments in the world trading
community to see whether a broad
consensus can be reached."
PROGRESS
It proved possible for each of the
two main negotiating groups - the
developed Group B countries and the
Group of 77 - to achieve a 'broad
consensus' among themselves. The
positions of the two groups prior to the
flew Delhi conference are to be found in
UNCTAD Doc. TD/56, which gives the
position of the developed (OECD)countrieS,
nd UNCTAD Doc. TD/38, the Algiers charter
which gives the position of the Group
bf 77. It did not prove possible in
New Delhi, however, for the two
negotiating groups to reach a consensus
àn the details of the proposed General
System of Preferences (GPS). The only
Visible difference of the outcome of
the two conferences on this issue is
that whereas at the 1964 conferences the
developed countries either voted against
$r abstained from voting on the
referenccs resolution, at the 1968
conference the reolution was approved
unanimously. In 1964 the problem was
'o achieve agreement on whether a GPS
was desirable or not, in 1968 the proble*'
was whàt form, in detail,the GPS should
take.
CURRENT STATUS OF TilE PROPOSAL
The resolution adopted in New Delhi
established a Special Committee orn
preferences, as a subsidiary organ of
the UNCTAD Board. The resolution
'cquested that this Committee should
meet in November 1968 and shouldhave th
objective of settling the details of the
árrangements for the G.P.S. in the
course of 1969. The resolution con-
ciudad by noting "the hope expressed by
many countries that the arrangements
3hould enter into affect in early 1970".
MAIN ISSUES
On the basis of the Algiers Charter
and the OECD group report (and contem-
porary press releases and reports) it is
possible to assess which issues are
likely to have been the main causes of
conflict at New Delhi. The key issues
were probably: i) how to ensure that
the least advanced of the less developed
countries (LDCs) would, benefit from the
scheme; ii) what the basis for the
exclusion of specific products from the
outset should be; iii) what 'safety
theasures' clauses should be incorporated
into the scheme which the developed
countries could invoke whri they
considered that the 'disruption' of their
tharkets was threatened; iv) what should
be the duration of the scheme; y) what
to do about existing preference systems,
including reverse preferencs3s; and
vi) how to ensure equal sharing of the
burden of the GPS by the developed
countries. These issues are very much
inter-related, although it seems as if
hey were treated as separate issues in
hew Delhi. Judging from the evidence
available it appears that the key issue
4as the Froblem presented the least
advanced of the LDCs, particularly in
relation to the question of the
commodity coverage of the CI'S.
In order to provide a focus for the
dis cussion on preferences, the following
section will briefly examine these
issues and will attempt to define the
main points of. conflict arising under
each of them. It does not pretend to
be an exhaustive coverage, and nothing
is implied by the order in which they
are presented.
IThÓ Less Advanced Developing Countries
The problem is that the prefers-.
nces system is only intended to cover
semi-manufactured and manufactured
products, with processed agricultural
products beiñg pecifÏcally excluded
in the OECD report. Thus the
benefits would for the most part accrue
to those, relatively few, less
developed countries which already
have well established manufacturing
sectors Those less developed
countries, particular those in Africa,
who are dependent on exports of
agricultural products and only have a
primitive industrial sector could not
expect to benefit much from a
preference system which excluded
processed agricultural products. The
Grout of 77 appear to have been
unanimous in their insistence that the
ca)
CI'S should cover Bru3sel Uomenclature
Groups 1 to 24. On the other hand
there seems to have been disagreement
amàng the developed countries with the
extremes represented by the U.S.A.
who were in favour, of all processed or
manufactured goods 'being included and
by France who appear to have insisted
on the total exclusion of all
processed agricultural products.
Between the postions of the U.S.A.
and France were several countries who
favoured treating processed agricul-
tural products on a case-by-case
approach. The impasse on this issue
does not seem to have been breached
by the end of the conference.
Another point on this issue,
referred to in the Algiers Charter,
which does not seem to have been
taken up in the discussion at New
Delhi is that the tine limits of the
GPS could be made flexible. This sug-
gestion in effect means that the syst
would be 'rolling' in that the least
advanced LDCs would continue to
receive preferences after the more
advanced LDCs had ceased to benefit.
A rider to this suggestion was that
the developed countries should take
specific commitments of technical ad
financial assistance to the least
advanced LDCs to enable them to take
advantage of the GPS. The problem
with this suggestion is that it iS
in direct conflict with the deve)ioped
ecuntries position that they caruot
guarantee any period for the extension
of preferences - i.e. they retain the
right to negotiate.HFN tariff'
reductions among themselves.
That the problem ox what to do
about the least advanced of th LDCs
is a very real problem dcee not seem
to 'have been questioned. The
difficulty is what to do, about them
The author's view is that the GPS
should be seen as part of the glöbal
aid programme. and that the country by
country distribution of capital and
technical assistance should take into
accoun't. the expected and revealed
benefits of the GPS received by the
different L.DCs.
Exception lists.
The OECD report makes it clear
that before the developed countries
could be expected to approve of and
implement the GPS they would have to
be allowed to publish lists of producta
for which they were not prepared to
extend preferential treatment to.
The rules tor the inclusion of a
product in the exception lists
pear to be i) where an Thcrease in
imports of a product would cause
injury to domestic industry; ii) where
the domestic industry was classified
as a sensitive industry and iii) that
the burden of supporting the GPS
should be equitably distributed among
the developed countries, so that if
several of them put a product on their
exception lists others would be free to
do so too, to prevent their markets fron
being swamped with imrorts of the
product concerned. Unfortunately no
attempt appears to have been made to
give any rigorous definition to the
concepts 'injury', 'sensitive', and
It is obvious that these
concepts could be so interpreted as to
render the GPS totally useless, as al].
products of export interest to the
LDCs could quite conceivably be
excluded. This issue seems to have
been one in which a protectionist
attitude or behalf of the developed
countries sèems to have prevailed;
it is only such an attitude which can
give any meaning to such concepts as
'injury', 'sensitivity', and 'burden'.
This is obviously: one of the rnaorissu
tobe resolved in the committee
set up to continue the discussion on
preferences. The economist has
little to contribute to the discussion
of this issue as the outcome will
depend predominantly on the different
strength of the various domestic
induatriaipressure groups in the
developed countries.
Safety Measures
If we assume that meaningful
definitions are agreed for the
concepts of 'injury', 'sensitivity' (9)
and 'burden' then it is clear that in a
dynamic world economy industries in
developed countries which are not
currently regarded as sensitive or
subject to injury could come to be so
regarded. In this situation it is
recognised that there should be some
safety measures %4hich the developed
countries could invoke to safeguard
the interests of their industries.
In the words of the OECD report
"This would be necessary in order to
mitigate the possible effects of
increased competition in their markets,
or to provide a means of safeguarding
the export interests of third countrias,
whether beneficiary countries or not".
(TD/56,, 27.) In this connection what
lias to be icihed are the relative
merits of the two most discussed forms
that this safeguard mechanism might
take, viz.: a system of tariff quotas
under Tch if the clause was invoked
the importing country would specify
the quantity of imports of a product
it was prepared to allow in at the
preferential rate of duty, with all
imports above this figure being subject
ts the full HFN rate and other
applicable barrieral a system which if
invoked would allow the importing
country to limit the quantity of imporls
of the product concerned to some
specific figure, such as a proportion
of total domestic consumption, or
domestic production, or the previous
years imports The strongest
supporter of the first system has been
the U.S.A., and of the latter, France.
Duration of System
The OECD document makes it
very çlear that the GPS is intended
by them to be "temporary and
subject to periodic review", it is
to be regarded as a waiver of the
GATT rules and not an obligation.
The period suggested in the document
is ten years "subject to a major
review before this period elapsed in
order to determine in the light of
circumstances then prevailing whether
special treatment should be continued
modified, or abolished." (,L,L 37,)
This strong position was taken by
the developed countries in order to
maintain their freedom to negotiate
MFN tariff reductions in GATT. Thedocument takes the line that the
L.DCs would have to accept that the
preferential margin afforded by theGPS could be r3duced in this way.
In contrast to the OECD positionis that of the LDCs. In the AlgiersCharter they requested that the GPS
be an arrangement which would "last
for 20 years and (which) should be
reviewed towards the end of this
initial period. In any event the
preferential treatment should not there
Hfore be abruptly terminated." (Page
.lO,Yh.) Despite the obvious
conflict of opening positions of the
two sides on this issue it does not
seem to have taken up rauch time at
New Delhi. The issue seems to
reduce to the question of whether
the GPS is to be a temporary method
of assisting thé LbCs to establish
competitive manufacturing industry
or is envisaged as a new and
permanent method of providing aid for
the Third World. The developed
countries tend towards the former view
and the LDCs towards the latter,
although no explicit discussion. seems
to have taken place on. this point.There is also the. related question of
what is th& minimum period in which
an LDC can be expècted to establish a
competitive modern manufacturingindustry.
The question of duration
obviously has different implications
for LDCs with manufacturing sectors atdifferent stages of development.
Assuming that the GPS had a fairly
wide commodity coverage it is clear th4t
Hong Kong would reap substantialbenefit from the outset; for this
reason it is probable that both
sides would wish to exclude Nong Kong
from participation in the scheme.The problem, here is to define the ont.
enion of elegibility for participation
in the scheme. If comDetitiveness
is to be the criterion, as would be
implied by the exclusion of Hong Kong,
then several countries which could hardly
be regarded. as developed - e.g. India,
Pakistan, Taiwan, and llexico - would
be in danger of fairly early exclusion
from the GPS. The issue here is
whether the moving spirit underlying
the GPS idea is derived from the aid
argument or from the 'infant economy'
argument. 'Need for preferences' is
an ambiguous concept.
Existing Preference Systems
It seems to have been generally
agreed (except by the French) that
existing preference systems operated by
some developed countries in favour of
some less developed countries (the most
important of which are the Commonwealth
Preference System and the Yaounde
Convention System) should be abolishôd
upon the inauguration of the UNCTAD GPS.
This, it was argued, could involve
considerable hardship for some of the
less developed countries benefiting from
the existing systems (the author is not
convinced of this) and it seemed'
generally agreed between the two groups(Group B and the Group pf 77) at UNCTAD
that these countries should be compensø
ated for any losses they might expenienqe(the author is not convinced of thelogic of this agreement either).
The form of words which reflects the
agreement reached on this issu is
perhaps represented by the followirg
sentence taken from the Algiers Charter
(page g): "The new system of
preferences should ensure at least
equivalent advantages to developing cour-
tries enj eying preferences in certaindeveloped countries 10 enable the to
suspend their existing preference on
manufactures and semi-manufactures."
The difficulty which remains is that itis totally impos;ible to quantify the
concept of "at least equivalent
advantages". Xt is worth noting on
this point that the Commonwealth countr1ee
expressed their willingness to forego
their Commonwealth preferences in order
to participate in the GPS, as long asthe "at leastquiva1ent advantages were
fourthcoming. the. French and Fnancophle
African countries, however, seem to hav4
insisted that the GPS should be so
designed as not to conflict with the
benefits of discriminatory preferences
received by the Associated States of the
E.E.C.
Reverse Preferences
The U.S.A. hs more or leso made
it a condition of its acceptance of the
GPS that existing arrangement uhderwhib
some developed countries receive prefer.t
ential tariff entry to the markets of
some developing countries should be
abolished, Of the developed countries
currently benefiting from such arrange-
*nents it appears that only France took
the opportunity presented by New Delhi
to make it a major issue. From the
evidence it seems that France took the
Dine that the 'costs,' to the developed
Countries concerned of abolishing
reverse preferences should be regarded
as part of the burden they were
Iearing in supporting the GPS. This
rould seem to have been a tactical move
en the part of the French, in an attempt
o forestall some of the criticism of
he exception list they will eventually
roduce,
Burden Sharirtp
This was not an issue at the
New Delhi conference in the same way as
those examined above were. Much was
made of the notion by the developed
countries in tleir deliberations in the
OECD Special Group, as is iadicatedby
the, report of the group submitted to
UNCTAD. To the author 'burden
sharing', or even the notion of the
GP$ representing a 'burden' at all, is
totally meaningless. Can the replace-
ment of uncompetitive, previously
protected, domestic production by
cheaper. imports ever be suitably termed
a 'burden' to the importing country?
Attention might be usefully directed to
the question of whether the concept has
been introduced as an evasive tactic by
the developed countries to justify the (11)
restrictiveness of their negotiating
position on various aspects of the GPS,
or whether the notion really does refer
to a phenomenon which threatens the
successful and meaningful implementation
of the GPS.
Further Topics for Discussion,
The author would like to suggest
two ftther topics for consideration,
without developing them here in an
detail. The first is concerned with
the likely impact of the successful
implementation of the GPS The second
is cOncerned with how, the developed
countries might best provide for the
accommodation of the GPS in their
overall economic planning.
Imr'Ltcations of GPS
Little thought has been giveñ to
what the likely effect of a GPS on the
international economic situation would
be. It seems as though the proposera
and opposera of the scheme have bSn
content to discuss the scheme entirely
in relation to either the export
prospects of the LDCs taken as a group
or in relation to its impact on the
protected industries of the developed
countries. Two questions present
themselves as candidates for early end
urgent research. 1) Would the GP
encourage the rationalization of the
location of the world's industry, as
the supporters of the System have
claimed, or would it result in the
emergence of a situation ar'allel to
that prevailing in the primary commoditvt
market - i.e. surplus production of a
variety of manufactured goods? Now
would the distribution of market
opportunities amongst the various
LDCs be determined? 2) Would the type
of indue trilization that the GPS
encouraged be consistent with the
efficient and equitable development.of
the LDCa benefiting from the System?
Accommodation of GPS by Develoyed
Countries
A major problem 0f the GPS, ati11
to, be faced, is 'that of selling it to
the legislatures, induStrialists, and
public of the developed countries. It
is important that when this time comes
the whole notion of burden sharing
must have been entirely removed from
the debate. The public relations work
for the GPS should be based on the line
that it is in the developed coLintries
own interests. It should be shown
that the GPS is complementary to the
Kennedy ..Round for. exaiai4e and to any
further moves toward trade liberaliz-
ation on a global scale which may be
being considered at that time. It
could even be argued that such a scherne
was essential if full advantage was to
be taken by the developed countries of
the opportunities for expanded trade
among, themselves.
